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ESSAY
Informal Constitutional Change
ORAN DOYLE†
In response to Richard Albert’s Quasi-Constitutional Amendments,
65 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (2017).

INTRODUCTION
Quasi-Constitutional Amendments is Richard Albert’s
proposal for how we should theorize a prominent puzzle in
comparative constitutional law: the extent to which subconstitutional law and practice may appear to supplement
and change the legal standards contained in the master-text
written constitution.1 Claims that this phenomenon exists
always appear self-contradictory. How could the constitution
be amended without formal amendment? In this Essay, I
review and suggest some adjustments to Albert’s account of
quasi-constitutional amendments. In particular, I contend
that Albert is unwise to hold that a law counts as a quasiconstitutional amendment only if it was adopted with an
intention to controvert the normal amendment rules for the
constitution. This onerous requirement is extremely difficult
to establish, and deprives us of a conceptual framework for
many situations where the operation of norms in the mastertext constitution is changed without formal amendment.
More broadly, I critically assess whether it is helpful to
consider this phenomenon as a species of constitutional
amendment. Albert helpfully focuses our attention on the

† Associate Professor and Head of the School of Law, Trinity College Dublin.
1. Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739,
739 (2017).
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question of whether there is an alteration to the operation of
the norms in the master-text constitution. This alerts us to
the theoretical possibility that the operation of norms can be
altered without those norms being formally amended. I
suggest, however, that this insight of Albert’s should be
taken further. Rather than adjusting our understanding of
constitutional amendment to include quasi and informal
amendment, we need a broader understanding of
constitutions and constitutional change. We should recognize
the two overlapping but competing senses of the word
“constitution”: (1) the set of laws and practices that constitute
the governance structure of the state; versus (2) the written
master-text constitution. Informal changes to constitutional
laws and practices can alter the operation of the master-text
constitution without amending it in any sense—whether
formal, informal or quasi. This conceptualization is
significant. The phrase “informal constitutional amendment”
implies an improper subversion of formal processes.
However, if the master-text constitution is supplemented
and surrounded by a broader set of constitutional law and
practices, we have no general reason to maintain that
constitutional law and practice should only be changed
through the mechanism prescribed for the formal
amendment of the master-text constitution itself. Instead,
we need an open-ended assessment of whether, in a
particular case, formal amendment or informal change is
more appropriate.
I. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONS
The concept of quasi-constitutional amendments
provides a new way of understanding mismatches between
the constitutional law and practice of a state and its mastertext constitution. Scholars have previously employed the
ideas of informal constitutional amendment and
(quasi)constitutional statutes to solve this puzzle. In simple
terms, an informal constitutional amendment involves a
change to a state’s constitution that is achieved other than
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through
the
formal
amendment
process.2
A
(quasi)constitutional statute is an ordinary statutory law
that affects or forms part of the state’s constitution.3 An
ambiguity in the word “constitutional” underpins both
concepts. At a descriptive level, the word “constitutional”
bears two principal meanings.4 On the one hand, it refers to
the whole set of laws and practices that constitute the
governmental functions of the state. For ease of reference in
this Essay, I will refer to this as the “informal constitution.”5
On the other hand, it refers to a particular document with an
entrenched status at the apex of the legal system: the
master-text constitution.6 What distinguishes the informal
constitution is content and function—do the laws and
practices constitute the governance apparatus of a state?
What distinguishes the master-text constitution is status—
is this the highest law of the state? All states have an

2. For a useful recent account of the debate over informal constitutional
amendments, see Craig Martin, The Legitimacy of Informal Constitutional
Amendment and the “Reinterpretation” of Japan’s War Powers, 40 FORDHAM INT’L
L. J. 427 (2017).
3. For an account of constitutional statutes in the United Kingdom, see
Farah Ahmed & Adam Perry, Constitutional Statutes, 37 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
461 (2017). For an account of quasi-constitutional statutes in Canada, see
Vanessa MacDonnell, A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation, 53 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 508 (2016).
4. This ambiguity and distinction reflects what Loughlin has referred to as
the two conceptions of constitution. Martin Loughlin, Constitutional Theory: A
25th Anniversary Essay, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 183, 184 (2005) (“The
contrast . . . reveals two senses of the term constitution. A constitution can be
viewed not only as a text, but also as an expression of a political way of being.” ).
5. There is no particular magic to this phrase. The underlying phenomenon
is broadly similar to what, in the U.S. context, Amar describes as the “unwritten
constitution,” see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012), and Tribe describes as the
“invisible constitution,” see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION
(2008). I believe “informal” is preferable to “unwritten” and “invisible” because
many of the referenced laws are neither unwritten nor invisible; rather, the point
is that they are not written in one place. However, there may well be better terms
than “informal constitution.”
6. For a discussion on master-text constitutions, see JOHN GARDNER, LAW AS
90 (2012).
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informal constitution; nearly all states have a master-text
constitution.
There is considerable overlap between the content of the
informal constitution and the content of the master-text
constitution. The very fact that the master-text constitution
is superior to all other laws means that it must contain the
most important constituting laws. However, the overlap is
rarely, if ever, complete. Not all laws that constitute the
governance structure of the state must be contained in the
master-text constitution. At the very least, some level of
detail will usually be regulated outside the master-text
constitution. Moreover, most constitutional systems contain
constitutional conventions that are—by definition—located
outside the master-text constitution.7 Conversely, mastertext constitutions may contain many provisions that do not
constitute the governance function of the state. For instance,
master-text constitutions are a site for the expression of
important national values,8 preambles being the paradigm
example.9 Also, master-text constitutions contain laws that
do not constitute the governance function of the state, most
obviously fundamental rights provisions. The standard of
what is constitutional—in the sense of being part of the
informal constitution—is common across states. The
standard of what is constitutional—in the sense of being
contained in a master-text constitution—varies from state to
state. Although the informal constitution of a state will
include much of what is contained in the master-text
constitution, for the rest of this Essay I shall use the term
7. For discussion of constitutional conventions in jurisdictions with a
master-text constitution, see Lorenzo Cuocolo, Constitutional Conventions and
the Economic Crisis: The Italian Paradigm, 38 DUBLIN U. L. J. 265 (2015); Greg
Taylor, Convention by Consensus: Constitutional Conventions in Germany, 12
INT’L J. CONST. L. 303 (2014); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 DUBLIN
U. L. J. 283 (2015).
8. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 (1996).
9. WIM VOERMANS, MAARTEN STREMLER & PAUL CLITEUR, CONSTITUTIONAL
PREAMBLES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (2017).
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“informal constitution” to refer only to those constitutional
laws and practices that are not contained in the master-text
constitution. This preserves a linguistic distinction that
allows us to conceptualize the mismatch between what is
contained in the master-text constitution and other
constitutional laws and practices.10
A further understanding of “constitutional” derives from
the fact that both the informal constitution and the mastertext constitution contain norms. Laws and practices can
therefore be classed as constitutional or unconstitutional
depending on their conformity with the norms in the
constitution, whether informal or master-text. Given that
the master-text constitution is taken to be the highest law
within the state, if aspects of the informal constitution are
unconstitutional in the sense of contradicting norms in the
master-text constitution, they can be deemed invalid. This
lies at the core of the puzzle: how can the informal
constitution change the master-text constitution without
being deemed unconstitutional, and therefore of no legal
effect?
We can usefully understand the concepts of
(quasi)constitutional statutes, informal constitutional
amendment and, as we shall see later, quasi-constitutional
amendment in these terms. A (quasi)constitutional statute is
part of the informal constitution but not the master-text
constitution. An informal constitutional amendment
involves a change to the informal constitution without
formally amending the master-text constitution. It is easy to
accept that the informal constitution supplements the
master-text constitution. Much more difficult are cases
where the informal constitution appears to change the
master-text constitution. Any such attempt should surely be
unconstitutional and therefore invalid. Nevertheless,
sometimes the informal constitution appears to persist

10. I shall relax this stipulation in my concluding paragraphs to allow me
develop one point.
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notwithstanding inconsistency with the master-text
constitution. Albert’s article suggests that this amounts to
quasi-constitutional amendment of the constitution.
II. QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Albert defines quasi-constitutional amendments as
follows:
A quasi-constitutional amendment is a sub-constitutional
alteration to the operation of a set of existing norms in the
constitution—a change that does not possess the same legal status
as a constitutional amendment, that is formally susceptible to
statutory repeal or revision, but that may achieve the function,
though not the formal status, of constitutional law over time as a
result of its subject-matter and importance—making it just as
durable as a constitutional amendment.11

Albert also adds a requirement of intentionality:
quasi-constitutional amendments are the result of a self-conscious
circumvention of onerous rules of formal amendment in order to
alter the operation of a set of existing norms in the constitution.12

Taking these together, we can identify four criteria for a
quasi-constitutional amendment:
•
•
•
•

It does not have the same legal status as the master-text
constitution.
It may achieve the function of constitutional law over time
making it just as durable as a constitutional amendment.
It alters the operation of the existing norms in the constitution.
It must have been adopted as a self-conscious attempt to
circumvent the formal rules of amendment.

There is some inconsistency in how Albert treats status,
function, and durability. He later refers to constitutional
11. Albert, supra note 1, at 740. Albert, I suspect that those who first learn
constitutional law in a jurisdiction without a master-text constitution, principally
those from the United Kingdom and New Zealand, will emphasise the
constitution in the first sense. Those who learn their constitution from
jurisdictions with a master-text constitution, such as the US or Ireland, will
emphasise the constitution in the second sense. Canada lies somewhere between
the two.
12. Id. at 741–42.
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actors having “recourse to these sub-constitutional strategies
for constitution-level changes,”13 and characterizes his three
Canadian examples (discussed below) as “constitution-level
changes.”14 In his conclusion, he suggests that “quasiconstitutional amendments may nonetheless over time
acquire constitutional status as a result of their subjectmatter or importance.”15 Merging these points with his
earlier definition, it seems that a quasi-constitutional
amendment, although not made in a way that immediately
confers formal constitutional status on it, may acquire
something akin to that status over time if it is as durable as
a formal constitutional amendment. If we read Albert’s
analysis in this way, the first two criteria largely reflect the
interaction of the informal and master-text constitution: a
law can regulate matters of constitutional significance
without being part of the master-text constitution. These
criteria are also met by (quasi)constitutional statutes.
The third criterion is more onerous. Altering “the
operation of the existing norms in the constitution” is, on its
face, ambiguous between the two senses of constitution.
However, because all laws that meet the first two criteria
necessarily alter the operation of norms in the informal
constitution, it is appropriate to read the third criterion as
referring to the master-text constitution. Otherwise, it would
be redundant. This explains Albert’s choice of “quasiamendment”: the law does not actually amend the norms in
the master-text constitution but does something akin to
amendment by altering the operation of those norms. Albert
uses “norm” in the standard sense of constraints on
behavior.16 The master-text constitution contains norms that
13. Id. at 742.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 765.
16. For a discussion of constitutional constraints in the context of
amendment, see Oran Doyle, Constraints on Constitutional Amendment Powers,
in THE FOUNDATIONS AND TRADITIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Richard
Albert et al. eds., 2017).
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constrain the behavior of constitutional actors. These norms
can be amended through the formal process for amendment.
But what does it mean to change the operation of a norm,
without changing the norm itself? It seems to me that Albert
envisages something like the following.
Where norms are followed, one can observe a pattern of
norm-compliant behavior. For instance, we might observe a
pattern of drivers stopping their cars at a red traffic light at
a junction as a pattern of norm-compliant behaviour.
Suppose that many pedestrians need to cross the road at the
junction following a major sporting event. A police officer
begins to direct traffic in a way that does not cohere with the
sequence of traffic lights. At this point, the pattern of
behavior is no longer norm-compliant, although the norm has
not been changed. We might say that there has been a
temporary alteration to the operation of the norm. If we
apply this to the constitutional context, we would say that
there is a quasi-constitutional amendment where
constitutional officials change their pattern of behavior such
that it no longer matches what one would expect if officials
were following the norms in the master-text constitution.
This fleshes out Albert’s understanding of the status of the
quasi-constitutional amendment: it does not have quite the
same status as a formal constitutional amendment, but it is
close to that status because it alters the operation of norms
in the master-text constitution.
Albert’s fourth and final criterion for quasiconstitutional amendments grafts an element of
intentionality onto the third criterion. Not only must the
operation of the existing norms in the constitution be altered;
there must have been a “self-conscious circumvention of
onerous rules of formal amendment . . . .”17 This requirement
of intentionality introduces significant epistemological
difficulties. Intentionality is a notoriously slippery concept,
even in the straightforward context of one individual
17. Albert, supra note 1, at 741–42.
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intending to carry out an empirically observable act.18 In the
context of constitutional practice, an intentionality
requirement is especially demanding. We must establish the
intention of a collective actor, not an individual human, with
respect to (a) a set of contestable legal standards that
indicate what is permitted by the formal rules of amendment
and (b) whether the proposed action subverts those
standards. Even allowing for the possibility of such an
intention, there would be significant difficulties in
establishing it in any particular case. It also rules out the
inclusion of constitutional conventions as a mode of quasiconstitutional amendment because conventions are not
intentionally formed but rather depend on an emerging
attitude to an existing pattern of behavior. Given the
difficulties in satisfying this criterion, we will likely be faced
with examples of laws and practices that meet Albert’s first
three criteria, but not this fourth criterion. Because the
function of such practices in a constitutional system is the
same, irrespective of intentionality, it would be
inappropriate to develop two discrete concepts. A simpler
approach would be to discard the intentionality criterion:
quasi-constitutional amendments would therefore be
established once the first three criteria are satisfied. An
intentional quasi-amendment might be the occasion of
greater political criticism, but it is not a discrete analytical
concept.
III. CANADIAN EXAMPLES OF QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS
Albert offers three Canadian examples of quasiconstitutional amendments.19 In 1996, the Federal
Parliament passed the Regional Veto Law. The law requires
a Cabinet Minister to first obtain the consent of each of the

18. For a discussion of the difficulties of intention in the criminal context, see
BEBHINN DONNELLY-LAZAROV, A PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 7–34 (2015).
19. Albert, supra note 1, at 740, 745–46, 748.

1030

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

five major regions as well as a majority of all provinces before
introducing a major amendment proposal under the
multilateral default amendment procedure.20 Ontario,
Quebec and British Columbia are each treated as a region,
giving each of these Provinces a veto.21 For the Prairie and
Atlantic regions, two Provinces that together represent at
least half of the regional population can exercise the veto.22
Therefore, the substantive effect—if not the form—of the
Regional Veto Law is to introduce a statutory requirement
that must be satisfied in addition to the requirements
contained in the master-text constitution.23 This makes
amendment more difficult by granting an effective veto
power to constitutional actors who otherwise would not have
such a power.
The Regional Veto Law meets the first two of Albert’s
criteria for quasi-constitutional amendments. It is part of the
informal constitution but not part of the master-text
constitution. The question remains, however, whether it
alters how the existing norms in the Constitution operate.
The default amendment procedure produces a certain
pattern of behavior by constitutional actors in the context of
constitutional amendment.24 The pattern of constitutional
amendment, taking account of the Regional Veto Law, must
be different. In fact, no amendments have been passed under
this procedure since the Regional Veto Law, and it is
impossible to know whether any amendments would have
been passed in absence of the Regional Veto Law.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the
Regional Veto Law has affected the behavioral pattern of
20. See An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, (S.C. 1996, c. 1) (Can.).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The Law does not appear to preclude ordinary Members of the Federal
Parliament, as distinct from the Government, from introducing amendment
proposals. However, there is little likelihood of success for such an amendment
where the Government is all but guaranteed a majority in Parliament.
24. Albert, supra note 1, at 747.
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constitutional actors, thereby altering the operation of norms
in the master-text constitution.
Finally, was the Regional Veto Law a “self-conscious
circumvention of onerous rules of amendment”?25 Albert
reports that the Law “fulfilled the federal government’s
promise to give Quebec a veto over future constitutional
amendments, a pledge made as an inducement to encourage
Quebec voters to reject secession.”26 It is reasonable to infer
that the law was a self-conscious attempt to make the
constitution more difficult to amend. However, the law was
not necessarily an attempt to circumvent the formal rules of
amendment. We cannot straightforwardly count comments
by members of the federal government as evidence of the
later intention of a different collective actor. Perhaps the
Parliament chose to enact the Regional Veto Law, rather
than formally amend the constitution, because it wanted to
reserve for itself the possibility of repealing the Regional
Veto Law in future. This would not have been possible if the
substance of the Regional Veto Law were contained in a
constitutional amendment. Although it is possible that the
Regional Veto Law meets Albert’s fourth criterion for quasiconstitutional amendment, we cannot be reasonably sure
that it does so. This example supports my suggestion that
Albert is unwise to include this criterion in his concept of
quasi-constitutional amendment. The way in which the
Regional Veto Law operates and its constitutional and
political implications have little if anything to do with the
intentions of those who enacted it. Why should we make our
ability to conceptualize it hostage to the difficulty of
establishing those intentions?
Albert’s second Canadian example concerns a new
method, introduced in 2016, for the appointment of
Senators.27 The Government established a non-statutory
25. Id. at 741–42.
26. Id. at 746.
27. Albert, supra note 1, at 748.
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Independent Advisory Board to make appointment
recommendations to the Prime Minister.28 Under section 24
of the Canadian Constitution, the Governor General
appoints Senators.29 By convention, the Governor General
follows the advice of the Prime Minister.30 The new process
introduces a further preliminary stage whereby the nonstatutory Independent Advisory Board makes a
recommendation of five possible names for each vacancy.31
Again, this example easily satisfies the first two of Albert’s
criteria: this is a practice—not a law—on a matter of
constitutional significance that is not contained in the
master-text constitution. However, it seems to me that it
does not alter the operation of the norms in the master-text
constitution. On the one hand, the practice of the Governor
General following the advice of the Prime Minister is not
itself contained in the master-text constitution; it is a matter
of constitutional convention. On the other hand, even if we
were to treat Prime Minister’s nomination as governed by
the master-text constitution, we still cannot say that the
establishment of the Independent Advisory Board alters the
operation of those norms. The Prime Minister remains free
to nominate anyone she wishes. Given that the Independent
Advisory Board does not alter the operation of the norms in
the master-text constitution, it is difficult to establish that it
was adopted with an intention to circumvent the norms of
constitutional amendment.
Albert’s third Canadian example is the Canadian Bill of
Rights, which was enacted in 1960. As presented by Albert,
the Bill of Rights imposed an obligation on the Minister for
Justice “to review every government bill for consistency with
the list of recognized rights and freedoms, and to report any
28. Id.
29. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 § 24 (U.K.).
30. See id.
31. Press Release, Gov’t of Can., Government Announces Immediate Senate
Reform (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/governmentannounces-immediate-senate-reform-2079118.htm.
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inconsistency to the House of Commons.”32 This example
again satisfies the first two criteria with relative ease: it is
part of the informal constitution (the process for the
enactment of legislation), but is not contained in the mastertext constitution. However, as above, it’s doubtful whether it
satisfies the third and fourth criteria. The only obligations
are on the Minister for Justice to: (1) review government
bills, and (2) report inconsistencies to the House of
Commons.33 It is a significant stretch to characterize this as
an alteration to the operation of the norms in the master-text
constitution. Since the master-text Canadian Constitution is
silent on these issues, any changes made by the Canadian
Bill of Rights are to constitutional norms that already
operate outside the master-text constitution. At most, it
seems to be the addition of a supplementary practice. For the
same reason, it cannot be said that the Bill of Rights was a
self-conscious attempt to circumvent the formal amendment
rules.
In sum, Albert’s three Canadian examples substantiate
the concerns about the difficulty of satisfying the criterion of
intentionality. They support the view that it would be better
not to include that criterion. Of the three examples, only the
Regional Veto Law meets the criterion of altering the
operation of norms in the master-text constitution.
Nevertheless, Albert is right—in my view—to include this
criterion. The first two criteria amount to the relatively
uninteresting proposition that there is an informal
constitution that can be amended by the informal
constitution. The criterion of altering the operation of norms
in the master-text constitution distinguishes a phenomenon
that raises altogether different concerns. Because of the
highest legal status afforded to the master-text constitution,
its interaction with the informal constitution raises a
32. Albert, supra note 1, at 102 n.3.
33. There is no alteration to the operation of norms in respect of rights
protection. Parliament is not constrained to comply with fundamental rights; the
courts are not empowered to review legislation.
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discrete set of moral-political concerns, highlighted by
further reflection on the Regional Veto Law.
The Regional Veto Law altered the operation of the
existing amendment norms in the master-text constitution
for future cases. In other words, constitutional actors used a
less onerous change procedure in order to make formal
change more onerous in the future. Furthermore, the
Regional Veto Law intruded into an area that might have
been thought to be comprehensively regulated by the mastertext constitution. Section 38(1) of the Canadian Constitution
allows for constitutional amendments, on the stipulated
topics, where there are (a) resolutions of the Senate and
House of Commons; and (b) resolutions of the legislative
assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces that have,
in the aggregate, according to the then latest general census,
at least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces.34
The Regional Veto Law, in substance if not in form,
introduces an additional requirement, meaning that what
the master-text constitution envisages as adequate support
for a constitutional amendment no longer amounts to
adequate support. Moreover, section 38(1) takes its place
within a schema of amendment procedures that make
different distributions of amendment powers among
constitutional actors. The Regional Veto Law disrupts that
distribution of powers, pushing the multilateral procedure
towards (but not quite reaching) the requirements of the
unanimity procedure. In this regard, it also draws a
differentiation between Provinces that is not present in any
of the other amendment processes—some Provinces have the
veto right, others do not.
For all of these reasons, the Regional Veto Law provides
a paradigm case of the political-moral concerns that Albert
raises with quasi-constitutional amendments. They “risk
obscuring the ordinary hierarchy of authority” in a

34. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §
38(1) (U.K.) [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
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constitutional state and “undermine the very purpose of
codification.”35 Albert suggests that the Regional Veto Law
may “quite possibly [be] unconstitutional.”36 However, even
if such an argument cannot be successfully made under
Canada’s master-text constitution, the political-moral
concerns of federalism remain. Albert’s third criterion
distinguishes what is special about this law: it is more than
a (quasi)constitutional statute. Laws and practices that alter
the operation of norms in the master-text constitution raise
distinct concerns that require distinct analysis.
IV. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
I shall conclude, however, by sketching an argument that
a proper understanding of informal constitutions and
master-text constitutions provides a simpler and more
accurate understanding of the puzzle identified at the start
of this Essay: the extent to which sub-constitutional law and
practice can appear to supplement and change the legal
standards contained in the master-text written constitution.
Once we recognize that there is an informal constitution
separate from the master-text constitution, we can readily
understand that laws and practices of constitutional
significance can exist outside the master-text constitution.
The stipulated process for amending the master-text
constitution simply does not apply to those constitutional
laws and practices that are located outside the master-text
constitution. The informal constitution can of course be
changed informally. What is more difficult to explain are
situations where the informal constitution appears to change
the master-text constitution.
The concepts of informal constitutional amendment and
quasi-constitutional amendment both suggest that there has
been something akin to an amendment of the master-text
constitution. However, it is unhelpful and misleading to
35. Albert, supra note 1, at 742.
36. Id. at 766.
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understand what has occurred as a watered-down version of
amendment. If we consider again the Regional Veto Law, we
can see that there has been no textual change to the mastertext constitution: the Regional Veto Law could be repealed
by ordinary legislation and it might be declared
unconstitutional by a court. This is inconsistent with a
conclusion that there has been an amendment, even an
informal or quasi-amendment, of the master-text
constitution. In short, there has been no change to the
master-text constitution at all. Rather, there has been a
change to how the master-text constitution is treated. A
change in the informal constitution has led to the norms of
the master-text constitution no longer being followed,
perhaps temporarily or perhaps indefinitely. The real
challenge is to explain how the informal constitution could
be used to achieve such an outcome without being declared
“unconstitutional” (with reference to the master-text
constitution) and thereby eliminated from the legal order.
If the superiority of the master-text constitution is
simply a postulate of the legal system, then such an outcome
is incomprehensible. However, if we treat the status of the
master-text constitution not as a postulate but as something
that requires explanation, then new possibilities open up.
Adapting H.L.A. Hart, I suggest that master-text
constitutions derive their legal status through patterns of
acceptance by legal officials. However, legal officials may
also accept other laws and practices, independent of the
master-text constitution, as being valid within their legal
system. For example, in Ireland, legal officials all accept that
previous judicial decisions are a source of law for future
cases, despite the fact that nothing in the constitution or any
law validated by the constitution establishes a doctrine of
precedent. If the validity and superiority of the master-text
constitution is not an unquestionable postulate but rather a
fact contingent upon the behavior of legal officials, then it
follows that those legal officials may act in a way that is
inconsistent with the master-text constitution. In this way,
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the informal constitution may not only supplement, but also
change the operation of the norms of the master-text
constitution without amending the master-text constitution
in any sense.
For both the informal constitution and the master-text
constitution, what matters is not the document, laws, or
practices, but rather how they are treated by constitutionally
significant actors. This explains Albert’s emphasis on
durability through time in assessing whether (in his
terminology) a quasi-constitutional amendment has been
made. We cannot know straightaway whether the informal
constitution has shifted the operation of norms in the
master-text constitution—only time will tell whether
constitutionally significant actors have accepted changes in
the informal constitution. It is problematic to analogize these
constitutional changes to amendment. This will cause us to
misunderstand how the changes occur and how they can be
undone in the future. The operation of norms in the mastertext constitution always depends on the informal
constitution; changes in the informal constitution can shift
the operation of master-text constitution norms, without
amendment (in any sense) of the master-text constitution.
I defined “informal constitution” in a way that excluded
the content of the master-text constitution in order to
preserve a linguistic distinction that would allow us to focus
on how the master-text constitution can be influenced by
laws and practices that exist outside of it. However, in
conclusion it is appropriate to relax that stipulation and
recall that the informal constitution includes much of the
content of the master-text constitution. This emphasises the
lack of hierarchical relationship between the two. This does
not mean that it is always appropriate to alter the operation
of norms in the master-text constitution rather than seek to
amend it formally. Albert correctly identifies costs with such
a practice: it obscures the ordinary hierarchy of authority in
a constitutional state and undermines the very purpose of
codification. Nevertheless, in some instances the difficulty of
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formal amendment and the attractiveness of the legal
change may outweigh those costs. The Regional Veto Law
seems an improper interference with a difficult federal
compromise. However, the convention that the Governor
General is bound by the Prime Minister’s advice in the
appointment of Senators was an appropriate constitutional
change. The court-identified convention of substantial
provincial consent required for the patriation of the
Canadian Constitution in 1982 is more contestable.37 In
other words, the appropriateness of all forms of
constitutional change requires open-ended consideration.
Analysis in terms of quasi-constitutional amendments
suggests that some types of constitutional change are by
their very nature suspicious. This is not the case. We should
instead recognize that constitutional change can occur both
through formal constitutional amendment and through
informal constitutional change. The appropriate method of
constitutional change depends on all the circumstances of the
case, not a preconception that quasi-constitutional
amendments are inherently problematic.

37. Oran Doyle, Constitutional Transitions, Abusive Constitutionalism and
Conventional Constraint, 37 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 67, 76 (2017).

